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Abstract 
This paper presents a STAMP-based indicator of measuring the inherent, in terms of the system design and development, capability 
of each system part to provide its agent with Situation Awareness (SA) about the presence of system threats and vulnerabilities that 
may lead to accidents. An agent is a human or automated controller that possesses reasoning mechanisms and demonstrates a 
capability to influence others or modify situations. This capability – in as far as it pertains to risk modification - is called “risk SA 
provision capability” (RiskSOAP) and can be modelled in a control loop. This capability is considered as dynamic because it can 
fluctuate over time due to changes in safety specifications and short- or long-term conditions. In order to demonstrate the fluctuation 
of the risk SA provision capability along the development of an accident, the STAMP-based RiskSOAP indicator is calculated 
throughout the Überlingen accident timeline. This timeline incorporates four milestones, each one denoting a particular time point 
in the accident development. The decline in the value of the RiskSOAP indicator is attributed to the presence of flaws and unsafe 
control actions, through which accident scenarios are verified and the system is headed for an accident. The main conclusion is that 
in such socio-technical systems there is a tight coupling between the degradation of the risk SA provision capability and the 
degradation of safety. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Peer-review under responsibility of the organizing committee of STAMP EU 2015. 
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1. Introduction 
Complex socio-technical systems require a more holistic reasoning and targeted approaches than those offered by 
traditional Situation Awareness (SA) models. Current SA measurement techniques are not adequate and/or valid for 
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estimating SA in complex socio-technical systems settings [1]. In particular, with the current technological basis (i.e. 
we cannot constantly monitor human brain functions and reactions to stimuli) it is the cognitive and distributed 
‘character’ of SA in complex socio-technical systems that possibly renders its direct measurement quite a challenging 
task, if not impossible [1]. 
In literature there is a debate whether SA is a folk model [2] or a key concept for safety science [3]. This paper, 
however, does not address that dilemma, but suggests a different approach to SA. We elaborate on an inherent 
capability of each system part to provide its controller with SA about the presence of system threats and vulnerabilities 
that may lead to accidents [4]. This inherent capability, called “risk SA provision capability” (RiskSOAP), is dynamic 
given that a system consists of a specific number and type of elements according to its design specifications, thus, the 
absence and/or inadequate functioning of them may entail the degradation of the risk SA provision capability. 
If the inadequate or missing system elements are not acknowledged and replaced or fixed, they will probably 
contribute to a safety drift. That is, the system’s defenses will be eroded, particularly in a time of degraded technical 
system capabilities [5], leaving the system controllers with no or degraded input, thereby rendering them unable to 
recognize a safety drift and envisage the system’s possible future states. Neither a direct measurement nor an 
assessment of SA shape the primary goal of this research work because the ‘measured substance’ is different compared 
to the existing SA measurement techniques. Instead, this work elaborates on the inherent risk SA provision capability 
of the system and demonstrates the relation between the risk SA provision capability and safety. On that account, this 
work presents an alternative approach to SA. 
In the Überlingen mid-air collision accident, along with the violated control actions and safety constraints causing 
a degradation of safety, the official accident investigation reports (e.g. [5]) name specific technical and human services 
and information content that were lost during the development of the accident, and contributed to it. At the same time, 
as long as the operative parts of the system were being decreased, the risk SA provision capability was also degrading, 
as this is demonstrated by the gradual decline of the calculated RiskSOAP indicator presented in the remaining of the 
paper. Thus, there was a negative impact simultaneously on the risk SA provision capability and safety due to the 
‘erosion’ of the system’s composition. According to the BFU [5] accident investigation report, had the short-term 
conflict alert (STCA) system not been downgraded, it would have provided the air traffic controller/manager 
(ATC/ATM) with a visual warning of collision trajectory instead of the auditory alarm alone. Furthermore, the 
presence of an ATC assistant would have resulted in an even distribution of workload and a more focused attention. 
These examples of the system losing two elements were identified by the BFU report [5] as systemic causes, and lead, 
in combination with other factors, to the degradation of the risk SA provision capability. In short, the degraded risk SA 
provision capability was a contributing factor in the Überlingen accident, indicating that the RiskSAOP did relate to 
safety. 
Based on the above reasoning, by applying the STAMP-based RiskSOAP indicator throughout the Überlingen 
accident timeline, the degradation of the risk SA provision capability over time is demonstrated. The decline in the 
value of the RiskSOAP indicator is attributed to the absence or malfunction of specific system elements and their 
interactions, as well as the presence of flaws and unsafe control actions through which accident scenarios are verified 
and, in turn, the system is headed for an accident. 
2. The RiskSOAP methodology 
The RiskSOAP methodology is founded on three already existing approaches, which were combined in a unique 
manner and executed in the following order (Figure 1): (1) the STAMP Based Process Analysis (STPA) [6]; (2) the 
Early Warning Sign Analysis based on the STPA (EWaSAP) approach [7], which in conjunction with STPA defines 
the elements and the characteristics that should be included in the ideal system design; (3) a binary dissimilarity 
measure to depict the distance between the ideal and the real system design. 
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Fig. 1. The phases of the RiskSOAP methodology. 
 
The RiskSOAP methodology can be used either one-off or in an iterative manner. As regards the former, if the aim 
is to select among alternative systems, then the RiskSOAP can be calculated once, one for each system design. 
However, in the latter case, when two or more design versions of the same system are about to be compared, then it is 
feasible to calculate the RiskSOAP indicator as many times as the different alternative versions of the system under 
consideration [8]. The second case is the one that is applied in this paper. 
2.1. STAMP and EWaSAP 
Leveson’s [9] Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) advocates that accidents represent a 
complex, dynamic process, meaning that they are not simply chains of component failures. A hazard analysis technique 
that encapsulates the principles of the STAMP accident causality model is STPA [6]. STPA is a top-down system 
engineering approach to system safety and can be used early in the system development process to generate high-level 
safety requirements and constraints. EWaSAP is an add-on to STPA [7] and its aim is to provide a structured method 
for identifying early warning signs through perceivable sets of data which indicate in a timely manner the presence of 
flaws and threats to a system [7]. Furthermore, EWaSAP introduces an additional type of control action, the awareness 
action. An awareness control action allows a controller to provide warning messages and alerts to other controllers 
inside or outside the system boundary, whenever data indicating the presence of threats or vulnerabilities is received 
and comprehended. 
STPA and EWaSAP could be performed as one process [7] (Table 1), or consecutively by executing STPA first 
and then EWaSAP. 
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Table 1. EWaSAP steps as add-ons to STPA 
STPA steps and description EWaSAP steps and description 
STPA(1) 
Identify system hazards & translate them into top-level 
safety constraints 
 
 EW(1) 
Decide if there is anyone outside the system who needs to be informed about 
the perceived progress of the hazard or about its occurrence 
STPA(2a) 
Create control structure (see Figure 3) 
 
STPA(2b) 
Determine how hazards can occur 
STPA(2c) 
Restate inadequate control actions as safety constraints 
 EW(2) 
Aim: Identify useful sensory services (i.e. video surveillance cameras 
pointing) installed in or possessed by systems outside of the system in focus 
and establish synergy 
EW(2a) 
For each top level safety constraint identify those signs which indicate its 
violation  
EW(2b) 
Find those systems in the surrounding environment with sensors capable of 
perceiving the signs defined in EW(2a) & request to establish synergy 
STPA(3a) 
For each element in the control structure create a model of 
the process it controls 
 
STPA(3b) 
Examine the parts of the control loops to determine if they 
can contribute to or cause system level hazards 
 EW(3) 
Aim: Enforce Internal Awareness Actions  
EW(3a) 
Describe what needs to be monitored & what type of features/capabilities the 
sensors must have so that to make the appropriate controllers capable of 
perceiving: 
- the signs indicating the occurrence of the flaw  
- the violation of the assumptions made during the design of the system  
EW(3b) 
After design trade-offs and selection of sensors, define which patterns of 
perceived data indicate the occurrence of the flaw and/or the violation of its 
designing assumptions 
EW(3c) 
Update the process models of the controllers with appropriate awareness and 
control actions, which should be enforced based on the perceived early 
warning signs, so that to warn about, adapt to, or eliminate the causal factor to 
the loss which is present in the system 
EW(3d) 
For each perceived warning sign, define its meta-data/attribute values to 
ensure that it will be perceived and ultimately understood by the appropriate 
controller/s 
STPA(4) 
Restate any flaws identified as safety constraints & repeat 
STPA(3a) & STPA(3b) 
 
 
2.2. Rogers-Tanimoto Dissimilarity Measure 
In the literature there are plenty of distance/dissimilarity measures [10,11], which detect the mismatching bits of 
two binary data sets. The selection of the proper dissimilarity measure is customised to the assumptions made by the 
investigator during a specific problem statement. 
In this research work Rogers-Tanimoto was chosen as the appropriate dissimilarity measure for comparing the 
design versions of the same system, on the basis that it is the only dissimilarity measure that gives weight to the 
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dissimilarities between two compared units by multiplying them by two, i.e. ‘ʹ ൈ ͳͲ’, ‘ʹ ൈ Ͳͳ’ [8]. The Rogers-
Tanimoto dissimilarity measure is given by the following formula: 

ሺǡ ሻ ൌ 210൅ 20111൅ 00൅ 210൅ 201 (1) 

The terms: ‘ͲͲ’, ‘Ͳͳ’, ‘ͳͲ’, and ‘ͳͳ’ denote the total number of the corresponding (0,0), (0,1), (1,0), and (1,1) 
pairs of binary integers, of the two compared units. Figure 2 shows that there is a one-by-one relationship between the 
binary integers that shape a specific pair. 

 
Fig. 2. A graphical explanation of the ‘pairs’ and ‘totals’ for the dissimilarity measures. 

In dissimilarity measures the following apply: 
a. The minimum dissimilarity is ‘0’, meaning that when the dissimilarity of two compared units tends to ‘1’, then 
the compared units are almost dissimilar. 
b. All variables are brought into a common scale, between ‘0’ and ‘1’, i.e. they are normalised. 
c. Distance can be defined as a dual of a similarity measure, i.e. ሺǡ ሻ ൌ ͳ െ ሺǡ ሻ. This literally means that a 
similarity can be expressed as the complementary of the corresponding dissimilarity, and vice versa. 
3. Case Study 
The RiskSOAP methodology was conducted for the case of the Überlingen mid-air collision accident. In this 
accident RiskSOAP measures the distance between the ‘ideal’ system design, as defined by the STPA hazard analysis 
technique, and the actual system state during different operational phases of the system’s life-cycle until the accident. 
Certain parts of the system were inoperative, meaning that the actual socio-technical system under study was already 
‘not ideal’; it included flaws and unsafe control actions followed by significant trade-offs and degraded modes of 
operation. In Figure 3 the elements that were gradually falling apart either from the design or during the operation of 
the system are depicted with dashed lines. 
In Phase 1, based on the safety control structure of the systems involved in the Überlingen accident (Figure 3), 
STPA and EWaSAP were applied for that accident in order to define the ‘ideal’ system composition. ATC1 and 2 
represent the two air traffic controllers being on duty in the ideal case. P1, 2, 3 are the three pilots of the three controlled 
aircraft and A1, 2, 3 are the three aircraft. TCAS1, 2, 3 are the systems installed in each of the three aircraft. 
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Fig. 3. The safety control structure for the Überlingen case. 

The examined accident was: Loss of human life due to aircraft collision and the hazard was: A pair of controlled 
aircraft violate minimum separation standards. The total number of safety requirements and sensor characteristics 
was 279: 119 safety requirements and 152 sensor characteristics were obtained by taking the STPA and EWaSAP 
steps respectively; 8 mental models and control algorithms resulted from the combination of the responsibilities and 
safety constraints that each of the controllers of the system should possess. These mental models and control 
algorithms could be either in the possession of a human or an automated controller depending on the responsibilities 
of the controller and the process or procedure considered each time. 
In Phase 2, all safety requirements and sensor characteristics that were derived from the STPA and EWaSAP 
shaped the ideal system vector, while the values obtained by mapping the present and absent system elements in the 
real system depicted the real system vector(s). 
Since the main purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the degradation of the risk SA provision capability, the 
RiskSOAP methodology and the corresponding indicator are applied throughout the Überlingen accident timeline. 
This timeline is divided into three sections, i.e. [t-1, t], [t, t+1] and [t+1, t+2], each one defined by a particular starting 
and ending time point in the accident development. The four time-points (marked on Figure 5) of the Überlingen 
accident timeline are as follows: “Existing regulations before the collision”, “Beginning of the nightshift”, “Flights 
become visible on the ATC’s screen”, “Aircraft in a collision trajectory”. It is worth mentioning that at the first time-
point, i.e. “Existing regulations before the collision”, the composition of the system incorporated regulations that 
existed before the collision, as well as any other system element (e.g. human and technical resources, communication 
channels) communicating the status of the system at that time. The labels assigned to the time-points had to be 
descriptive in terms of making the differences between the four time-points profound. 
In order to demonstrate how the degradation of the risk SA provision capability may cause a safety drift in the 
examined case of the Überlingen accident, the presence/absence of the system elements is mapped four times: (1) at 
50   Maria Mikela Chatzimichailidou and Ioannis M. Dokas /  Procedia Engineering  128 ( 2015 )  44 – 53 
the time-point ‘t-1’, based on the system’s composition according to the regulations before the Überlingen accident 
occurred; (2) at the time-point ‘t’, when the nightshift begins; (3) at the time-point ‘t+1’, when the conflicting flights 
become visible on radar; (4) at the time-point ‘t+2’, when the two aircraft are in a collision trajectory. Hence, four 
vectors were compared to the one that encapsulates the results of STPA and EWaSAP. 
In Phase 3 every component of the 279-sized vector that resulted from the STPA and EWaSAP was equal to ‘1’ 
because in the examined case of the Überlingen accident it reflected the ‘ideal’ system design version. As expected, 
the rest four vectors included both ‘1’ and ‘0’ values due to losses of system elements. Given the binary values assigned 
to the safety requirements and sensor characteristics, the Rogers-Tanimoto dissimilarity measure was calculated. The 
precise values of the terms of the Rogers-Tanimoto formula [equation (1)] are given in Table 2. With the use of the 
Rogers-Tanimoto measure, the value of the RiskSOAP indicator was calculated four times; one for each of the four 
time points shown in Table 2. The overall numerical results of the analysis are given in Table 2. An indicative 
illustration of how the vectors are compared to each other with the used of the dissimilarity measure is given in Figure 
4. 
 
   Table 2: The degradation of the risk SA provision capability given in numbers. 
STPA & EWaSAP 
Four milestones of the Überlingen accident timeline 
♦ t-1 ♦ t ♦ t+1 ♦ t+2 
Present 279 74 65↓ 63↓ 50↓ 
Absent - (‘ideal’) 205 214↑ 216↑ 229↑ 
RiskSOAP indicator 
via RTd(i,r) 
=0.8471 =0.8682↑ =0.8727↑ =0.9016↑ 
 
 
Fig. 4. Calculation of the Rogers-Tanimoto measure and RiskSOAP indicator for N real vectors compared to the ideal one 

According to Table 2, the number of system elements being present in the system composition diminishes, i.e. ‘↓’, 
while the number of those being absent expands, i.e. ‘↑’, along the accident’s course. Furthermore, the last row of 
Table 2 reveals that the decline, i.e. ‘↑’, of the RiskSOAP indicator evolves parallel to the accident development 
timeline. That is, every time a technical (e.g., main radar system), or a human (e.g., second ATC) service is lost, a 
further increase in the value of the RiskSOAP indicator is noticed. The gradual decline of the value signifies a further 
degradation of the risk SA provision capability of the system and a further deterioration of system safety. 

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Fig. 5. The milestone events after which the risk SA provision capability was measured. 
 
4. Discussion 
Aside from the degradation of the risk SA provision capability that did happen parallel to the development of the 
Überlingen accident, the decrease of the RiskSOAP indicator is attributed to the presence of flaws and unsafe control 
actions, through which accident scenarios are verified and the system is headed for an accident. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Accident scenarios verified when he risk SA provision capability was degrading. 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the gradual degradation of the risk SA provision capability for the systems involved in the 
Überlingen accident along with the unsafe control actions (UCAs) that were either embedded in the system, prior to 
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the ‘fatal’ nightshift, or occurred during that nightshift. In either of the two cases, the UCAs were attributed to the 
presence of specific flaws that, according to STPA, could have led to accident(s), as it did happen in reality. 
Ideally, according to the STPA hazard analysis, none of these UCAs should have occurred. In Figure 6, every ‘Cx’ 
represents one of the controllers (i.e. C1: ATC Zurich, C2: ATC Karlsruhe, C3&4: aircraft crews, C5: TCAS) of the 
system each time. For every controller, Figure 6 displays the corresponding control actions (CAs), e.g. C1:CA1. The 
displayed CAs were, in fact, the inadequate and unsafe control actions, corresponding to a specific controller and a 
specific CA he/she/ it was in charge to enforce (e.g. C1: CA1 - UCA1,2,3,4,5). Figure 6 includes the UCAs, i.e. CA 
(a) not provided, (b) provided at the wrong time, or (c) provided but not followed. that were involved in the Überlingen 
accident. The identified flaws were the causal factors considered to create the hazardous scenarios and contribute to 
the degradation of the risk SA provision capability. The UCAs given in Figure 6 were created by the above-mentioned 
flaws, which were either inherent in the system prior to the accident or induced during the migration of systems toward 
states of increasing risk [6]. It would be useful to note that there were UCAs being stopped at some time during the 
accident development, e.g. C2: CA1 - UCA1, and others being applied throughout the whole accident, like the C1: 
CA1 - UCA1. 
The results suggest that there is a relation between safety and the risk SA provision capability of a socio-technical 
system. Due to space-saving reasons, some indicative examples of the unsafe control actions identified by applying 
the STPA hazard analysis are displayed in Table 3. 
Table 3: Unsafe Control Actions defined for the Überlingen accident. 
Safety requirements & sensor characteristics not met 
(flaws) 
UCAs/ Accident scenarios Milestones 
1 Air navigation service companies should not 
tolerate one-manned operations 
Separate two aircraft provided (by the ATC) too late when two 
aircraft are too close to each other to start maneuvering and avoid 
collision (C1*-CA1-UCA3) 
t-1 
2 The Bypass System should be always 
available to the ATC, or in cases where it is 
out of service the ATC should be informed 
Warning not provided to the ATC Zurich in case when he does not 
realise the collision trajectory (C2*-CA1-UCA1) 
3 National civil aviation organisation should not 
be affected by national culture 
“Fly according to OP and FP” provided when the two crews do not 
adhere to the same standardised procedures (C3&4*-CA1-UCA2) 
4 Additional features should be added to the 
ATC displays after identified incidents or 
changes in practices 
Separate two aircraft not provided (by the TCAS, traffic alert and 
collision avoidance system) when aircraft in collision trajectory (C5*-
CA1-UCA1) 
5 There should be a downlink in place to pass 
the TCAS advisories to the ATC 
Separate two aircraft provided when TCAS issues opposite advisory 
(compared to the ATC) (C5*-CA1-UCA2) 
6 Automated systems or audits should provide 
necessary error checking to detect ATC's 
possible errors 
Separate two aircraft not provided (by the ATC) when two aircraft in 
collision trajectory (C1*-CA1-UCA1) 
t 
7 A sensor should be able to measure the (high) 
traffic 
Separate two aircraft provided wrongly: pair-wise advisories issued to 
the two crews are not complementary to each other; conflicting 
conditions emerge (C1*-CA1-UCA4) 
8 A sensor should detect whether the two 
aircraft have violated the minimum separation 
threshold 
Separate two aircraft provided wrongly: conflicting advisories 
between ATC and TCAS when it is not clear for the crew(s) on which 
one to adhere to (C1*-CA1-UCA5) 
t+1 
9 The ATC should be aware that the TCAS has 
the highest priority as a collision avoidance 
controlling tool 
Separate two aircraft provided when TCAS issues opposite advisory 
(compared to the ATC) (C1*-CA1-UCA2) 
t+2 
10 The crew should not ignore the copilot when 
he communicates a crucial information 
Adhere to TCAS provided too late when there is not much time left 
for maneuvers; collision avoidance not ensured (C3&4*-CA3-
UCA12) 
11 The crew(s) should verbally acknowledge the 
ATC advisory and/or the instructions given by 
the TCAS 
Separate two aircraft provided when TCAS issues opposite advisory 
(compared to the ATC) (C5*-CA1-UCA2) 
12 A sensor should calculate the relative location 
of the two aircraft in a timely manner 
Separate two aircraft provided too late (by the ATC) when two 
aircraft are too close to each other to start maneuvering and avoid 
collision (C1*-CA1-UCA3) 
 
The safety requirements & sensor characteristics listed in column 2 were all absent (i.e. 0) from the system involved 
in the accident. In an attempt to indicate the point on the overall safety control structure at which those elements were 
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absent, column 3 assigns each of them to the controller affected by their absence. In this way, the binary integers (i.e. 
0 and 1) were overlaid onto the hierarchical safety control structure and the hierarchy of the system as well. 
5. Conclusion 
In the Überlingen mid-air collision accident examined herein the risk SA provision capability was degrading 
gradually and in parallel to the degradation or loss of technical and human services, as well as information. However, 
according to the BFU [5] official accident investigation report, the deterioration or loss of those system elements along 
with the violated control actions and safety constraints caused a safety drift and thus contributed to the accident. This 
paper provided evidence of the relation between the risk SA provision capability and safety. It was also found that the 
degraded risk SA provision capability was a contributing factor in the Überlingen accident. Applying, therefore, the 
STAMP-based RiskSOAP indicator throughout the Überlingen accident timeline, the degradation of the risk SA 
provision capability was demonstrated and given a quantitative description. 
The results obtained for the Überlingen case suggested that the degradation of the risk SA provision capability over 
time, as clearly revealed by the gradual decline of the RiskSOAP indicator, was aligned with the accident timeline. 
Thus, the interpretation of the RiskSOAP indicator can lead to conclusions about the degradation or enhancement of 
the situation that the system is engaged in. Another interesting finding was that every time the value of the RiskSOAP 
indicator was calculated, the accident scenarios, which actually lead to the specific accident, were verified. 
More elaborate and extended experiments will further support the findings of this research. Moreover, the relation 
between safety and the risk SA provision capability of a system can be cross-checked through the application of the 
RiskSOAP methodology to additional engineering applications and to other research fields, such as healthcare, as 
well. 
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